Capital Wealth
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Markets & The Fed · Positioning

Some Stock Investors Are Rooting for a Rate Increase. Seriously.

For fifteen years a hike was the thing equity markets feared. This week the fear runs the other way — because the alternative is a bond market that stops believing the Fed.

By Sean Anees Saifi · Capital Wealth · Published Wednesday, September 16, 2026 · Source: The Wall Street Journal, September 16, 2026 edition, plus Tuesday’s market close as the paper printed it
Key Points
95%
market-implied odds of a hike by Tuesday
1/3 → 2/3
how the odds moved after Warsh’s Jackson Hole speech
July
the meeting that showed a hold can raise long rates
Multiyear
high in the 2-year’s gap over the overnight rate
A man at an office desk studies two monitors showing rising charts, a coffee mug and a leather notebook beside him.
Market-implied odds of an increase went from one-third in mid-August to 95% by Tuesday.
In one line: The market stopped fearing the Fed’s rate and started fearing its credibility. That is a different problem, and a quarter point is the cheap way to fix it.

“Stock investors had better hope the Federal Reserve raises rates Wednesday. Yes, seriously — it beats the alternative.”

That is Spencer Jakab, and the argument is worth following because it describes a genuine regime change in what markets are afraid of.

The old reflex

For at least the past fifteen years, the most important thing for equity investors to know on almost any given day was what rate setters might be thinking. When a piece of economic news was clearly good — higher-than-expected jobs growth, say — it was basically a coin flip whether the S&P 500 would rise or fall. Good news could be bad news if it raised the odds of a hike, which was read as a drag on stock prices and especially on rate-sensitive technology companies.

Sometimes the economic tea leaves were hard to read, but loose-lipped Fed officials left little to chance. By the time decision day arrived it was a foregone conclusion.

What broke it

Warsh’s first meeting as chair, in late July, was not like that. Many bond traders were betting on a hike and were wrong. And the market’s response to the hold was not relief — Jakab writes that Warsh’s “clumsy explanation played a role in pushing up longer-term interest rates set by the bond market.”

That is the whole reversal in one sentence. The Fed held, and long rates went up. Doubts about how committed rate setters are to tackling inflation have hurt the central bank’s sway over the bond market.

Which brings the risk into focus. On Monday the 10-year crossed 5%, hitting its highest intraday level since 2007. The market reaction to leaving rates unchanged again could be a repeat of July, or worse.

The most influential bond manager in the world, unimpressed

Jeffrey Gundlach, chief investment officer at DoubleLine Capital, said on a podcast last week: “There’s something about Kevin Warsh that I don’t fully trust.” He said he would expect long-term interest rates to rise fairly significantly in the aftermath of a decision to hold rates steady.

A hold would now be a far bigger surprise than in July, in no small part because of Warsh’s tough talk on inflation at a gathering of central bankers last month. The market-implied chance of a hike was one-third in mid-August, two-thirds after his speech, and 95% by Tuesday, per CME FedWatch. The gap between the 2-year Treasury yield and the Fed’s overnight rate widened to a multiyear high on Monday — which usually means the bond market expects an increase, and this time pencils in at least one more quarter-point move soon.

A vocal objection could come from the president, who appointed Warsh and wants cuts. Jakab’s response is four words: “be careful what you wish for.”

The idea underneath, which outlasts the week

Credibility is a strange asset. You cannot buy it, you cannot hold it, and it does not appear on any statement. But every long bond in a portfolio is priced partly off somebody’s estimate of how much of it the central bank has.

That is why the arithmetic here is asymmetric, and why Jakab lands where he does: one or two rate increases will hardly affect Main Street, or Wall Street for that matter. An out-of-control Treasury market sure would.

For a household, the translation is modest and useful: stop reading the Fed’s decision as a verdict on stocks, and start reading it as a statement about the long end — which is where the mortgage, the bond fund and the borrowing costs actually live.

What It Means For Your Portfolio

Watch — the risk moved from the rate to the credibility

Markets stopped fearing the Fed’s rate and started fearing its credibility. A quarter point is the cheap way to restore that; a hold is the expensive way to test it.

General planning principles, not advice for anyone in particular, and nothing here is a view on any individual manager’s opinion. The transferable idea is that the same policy action can be read two entirely different ways depending on what the market currently doubts — and right now what it doubts is resolve, not arithmetic.

The positioning consequence is caution concentrated in duration rather than in equities. Long nominal duration stays on the avoid list precisely because the bad scenario for it is a Fed that looks hesitant, which is not a scenario anyone can time. Short bills and floating-rate paper are indifferent to the question, which is the point of holding them.

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