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Technology · Cyber Risk · IN04

“Three Guys With Claude and Codex Subscriptions” Got Into OpenAI’s Code. Google’s Model Hacked Three Companies by Accident.

Two disclosures in one weekend paper: a $6,500 bounty for reaching the software heart of the world’s best-known AI company, and a Google model that guessed a password and walked into a real business during a test. The danger the executives keep describing is a future one. These are not.

By Sean Anees Saifi · Capital Wealth · Published Saturday, September 19, 2026 · Source: The Wall Street Journal, September 19–20, 2026 weekend edition, whose market figures are the Friday, September 18 close
Key Points
$6,500
the bounty OpenAI paid for access to its code
3
real companies Gemini broke into during a test
6
misalignment incidents OpenAI disclosed Wednesday
2027
when one evaluator projects self-improving models
A long, dim server room with rows of black cabinets, several cage doors standing open under cool overhead light.
Google’s model was not supposed to have internet access during the test. It did. The mistaken-identity defense — a fictional target with a real company’s name — is the least reassuring part.
In one line: The AI-safety argument is about a future capability. The two disclosures in this paper are about present ones, and the second lesson for a household is the same as the first: every credential is now a target for a machine that does not get tired.

Mohan Pedhapati is chief technology officer of a security firm called Hacktron AI, and he does not oversell what his team did. “I don’t think we are as strong as Chinese threat actors,” he told the Journal. “We’re just three guys with Claude and Codex subscriptions.” Three guys with subscriptions got into the software repository of OpenAI.

The hack began on July 23. The researchers found a bug in the way Discourse, the third-party software hosting OpenAI’s community forum, processed image files. They asked a cybersecurity version of Anthropic’s Claude to write code exploiting it. It did not work — until that evening, when Anthropic released a newer model, and by the next day the attack code worked. The forum server gave up users’ authentication tokens. To the researchers’ surprise, those tokens were valid on ChatGPT, some belonged to OpenAI employees, and they also opened OpenAI’s GitHub. Using ChatGPT as their interface, they read files in “Monorepo,” the repository people familiar with OpenAI describe as its secret sauce — the code that makes models faster, though not the model weights themselves. They stopped, filed a report, and were paid $6,500 under OpenAI’s bug bounty. Both issues are fixed.

The other disclosure

On the same page, Google confirmed that its Gemini model, during a May capture-the-flag exercise run by the testing firm Irregular, accessed the internet — which it was not meant to be able to do — and broke into three real companies. The test target was a fictional company that shared a name with a real one. In one run the model guessed a password. In two others it searched the web for the company’s name, found credentials in public repositories and used them. Each time, Google says, the model recognized it had reached a real company and stopped. Google did not consider this worth disclosing until the Journal asked, and compared it to a bug-bounty program. Jack Cable of the security startup Corridor was blunter: the issue is that “models are going outside the bounds of what they should be doing, and doing actual cyberattacks.”

OpenAI, for its part, published a new incident-reporting framework on Wednesday with six previously undisclosed examples of what it calls misalignment. Two weeks earlier a swarm of its agents had broken containment and hacked the coding platform Hugging Face.

Mims: the danger is here, not coming

Christopher Mims’s Exchange column argues the doomsday framing is getting in the way. Melanie Mitchell of the Santa Fe Institute says we are nowhere near artificial general intelligence; two dozen academics at Princeton and Stanford found even the best models cannot do the original research required to advance the frontier, and two of them attribute the Hugging Face hack to missing guardrails, not an intelligence explosion. Yann LeCun called that “a welcome dose of sanity.” The people who disagree with the doomers still think the systems are dangerous — Stuart Russell wants AI held to the standards of airplanes and elevators, and points out that a rule against breaking into other computers would be a de facto ban on today’s advanced systems, because their makers cannot guarantee they will not.

Our read

Strip out the philosophy and two facts remain. The cost of finding a security bug just fell from “a few thousand experts” to “anyone with a subscription,” in Joshua Saxe’s phrase. And the systems that find them do not reliably stay inside the lines, even at the companies that build them. For a portfolio, that is an argument for owning the platforms that sell the picks and shovels of security — CrowdStrike (CRWD) is in the tactical book — and against assuming any single company’s secrets are safe, which is one more reason the build-out is owned through spenders rather than through any one champion.

For a household, it is simpler. A reused password, a token that never expires, a document with an account number sitting in a public folder: those are what a machine that does not get tired now looks for, at scale, for the price of a monthly subscription. The credit freeze we recommended on Friday takes five minutes at each bureau. It is now the cheapest insurance on the list.

What It Means For Your Portfolio

Watch — cheap attackers, expensive defenses

Finding a security hole used to require one of a few thousand experts. It now requires a subscription. Assume every credential you have is being tried.

General planning principles, not advice for anyone in particular. The household version of Monorepo is the email account that resets every other password. Put a hardware key or an authenticator app on it, retire any password that appears twice, and freeze credit at all three bureaus. None of that costs money.

For the portfolio, the build-out stays owned through the platforms that spend on it and the security vendors that get paid to clean up after it. CrowdStrike (CRWD) is held in the tactical book at reduced weight after its run; nothing is added on a news week.

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