Capital Wealth
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Sports · Robert O’Connell · IN04

Michigan Paid $3 Million a Year for a Quarterback. Now Four Programs Have Buyer’s Remorse — and No Backup Plan

Robert O’Connell in Monday’s Journal and Jason Gay on Tuesday on the flip side of NIL: a program that spends everything on the starter can’t afford a backup, and the backups leave anyway. It’s a concentrated position with no hedge, and the sunk cost is doing the talking.

By Sean Anees Saifi · Capital Wealth · Published Wednesday, October 7, 2026 · Source: The Wall Street Journal, Monday, October 5, 2026, whose market figures are the Friday, October 2 close (Sports)
Key Points
$3 million
per year, Michigan’s NIL package for Bryce Underwood
$2 million
approximate price on South Carolina starter LaNorris Sellers
$1.5 million
estimated for Oklahoma’s John Mateer
0-2
Michigan in the Big Ten after the 20-14 loss to Minnesota
A college football player in a plain navy-and-gold uniform stands with his back to the camera, helmet in hand, on the sideline of a vast packed stadium under flat gray light, teammates blurred nearby.
The roster-budget math: every dollar on the starter is one not spent on the backup who’d replace him — and the backup has already left for a school where he can play.
In one line: Four programs paid $1.5 million to $3 million a year for a quarterback, kept nothing for a backup and now can’t bench the sunk cost — a concentrated position with no hedge, which is a portfolio mistake with shoulder pads.

It was the snap Michigan had bought and paid for. Down 20-14 to Minnesota on Saturday, fourth-and-5, the Big Ten season riding on it, sophomore quarterback Bryce Underwood took the drop, found nothing he liked and threw the ball away — out of bounds, game over. The $3 million-a-year investment — bankrolled in part by Larry Ellison and his wife, Jolin — had thrown the season away, literally. Robert O’Connell’s Monday Journal piece calls it buyer’s remorse, and he finds it from coast to coast; Jason Gay’s Tuesday column supplies the mood in Ann Arbor, which isn’t good.

The remorse list reads like a hedge fund’s worst quarter. Underwood, the No. 1 recruit in the country two years ago, has five touchdowns and four interceptions this season; Michigan has cracked 20 points once and sits 0-2 in the Big Ten and 3-2 overall — a record Gay points out would be 2-3 if replay officials hadn’t found an extra second against Western Michigan. South Carolina’s LaNorris Sellers (about $2 million) is suddenly in an open competition for his job. Oklahoma’s John Mateer, at an estimated $1.5 million, has had his security questioned by his own coach. Texas A&M paid a reported $3 million for Marcel Reed and lost its first two conference games by a combined 39 points.

The hedge walked out the door

Benching a star used to be the easy move; Nick Saban swapped Jalen Hurts for Tua Tagovailoa in the 2018 title game and won it. What changed is the roster-budget model. Spend $3 million on the starter and there’s no money left for a capable second-stringer — and the second-stringers who exist won’t wait behind an established name when the transfer portal pays elsewhere. Texas A&M’s Mike Elko says recruiting quarterback depth is impossible now. So the program is left holding one expensive, illiquid position and a coach saying, as Kyle Whittingham did Saturday night, “The results are unacceptable right now.”

Gay’s version is less clinical. The money, he writes, won’t hurt Ellison, but the cash-in intensifies the pressure on a 19-year-old; the $30 million sign-stealing fine still stings; and the new 66-year-old coach from Utah is getting pulled into the gloom. His summary: “Welcome to capitalism, everybody!”

Our read

This is Investments/Risk (IN04) with a Behavioral engine, and it isn’t about Oracle (ORCL), which we hold at weight with nothing added — Ellison appears here as a booster, not an executive. The portfolio mistake is textbook. One position so large there’s nothing left for a second one; a hedge (the backup) that was never bought because the star was ‘can’t-miss’; and then the sunk-cost reflex, where the size of the check decides the depth chart instead of the results. Whittingham’s line about evaluating everybody, at every position, is the healthy response, and it’s exactly what an honest review does with a concentrated holding: what would we do here if we hadn’t already paid for it?

Two moves. Size positions so a backup can exist — in a portfolio, that means no single name so large that its failure forces the plan to change. And when a holding’s results say what Michigan’s do, ask the Whittingham question out loud rather than waiting for the fourth-and-5. We’d rather look at the depth chart in October than in a bowl game nobody’s invited to.

What It Means For Your Portfolio

Hold — size positions so a backup can exist

Oracle (ORCL) is held at weight; nothing added — the Ellison tie is color, not a thesis. The position is a sizing rule: no holding so large that there’s nothing left for a backup, and no check so big it gets to pick the lineup.

General planning principles, not advice for anyone in particular. Cap any single position at a level where its failure would sting but not change the plan, and keep the hedge — cash, diversification, a second idea — funded before the star arrives, because it won’t be available later at the same price.

Evaluate holdings the way Whittingham says he evaluates players: everybody, every position, on the results — not on what was paid.

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